Photo : Messenger
In the annals of 2023, Pakistan grappled with an unprecedented surge in terrorist incidents, a predicament exacerbated by the triumph of the Taliban in Afghanistan. This success acted as a catalyst, emboldening and fortifying the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Over the past two years, the TTP underwent a transformative series of mergers, consolidating its organizational structure and recalibrating its operational strategy with an exclusive focus on waging war against Pakistan.
The ideological and tribal nexus forged between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP marked an unprecedented level of 'strategic depth' in the history of the region. This interconnection added layers of complexity to Pakistan's struggle against terrorism, unfolding against the backdrop of simultaneous political and economic challenges.
Notably, the genesis of this contemporary terrorism is deeply rooted in a protracted historical perspective that demands meticulous scrutiny to unearth its foundational causes. Understanding the intricate historical context becomes imperative for developing effective strategies to address the multifaceted challenges posed by terrorism.
In navigating these complexities, it becomes crucial for Pakistan to adopt a comprehensive approach. This involves not only robust security measures but also a nuanced understanding of the socio-economic and political factors that contribute to the appeal of extremist ideologies. International collaboration, particularly with neighboring countries like Afghanistan, is essential to develop a coordinated response to the shared challenge of terrorism.
In essence, the situation in 2023 underscores the need for a strategic and holistic approach that acknowledges the historical roots of terrorism, addresses concurrent political and economic issues, and fosters cooperation at the international level. Such an approach is essential for creating sustainable solutions to the complex security dynamics in the region.
During the Anglo-Indian era, Islam faced persistent assaults from British rulers and Hindu revivalists. Islamic scholars emerged as stalwart defenders of their faith, preventing Islam from succumbing to the fate experienced by other creeds in Asia. In 1806, Shah Abdul Aziz Mohaddith Dehlavi declared India under British dominion as Dar-ul-Harb (abode of war), asserting the obligation for Muslims to wage revolt for freedom, equality, justice, and revolution against the British government. In his fatwa, he articulated that expelling the British was the primary objective, after which it was deemed legitimate for Muslims to hold the reins of power. Consequently, Shah Abdul Aziz has been regarded as a precursor to the Indian Independence movement.
This legacy continued with Sayed Ahmad Barelvi, a devoted follower of Shah Abdul Aziz, who declared jihad (war) against non-Muslim rulers and met his demise in the Battle of Balakot in 1831. Islamic clerics and religious educational institutes played a pivotal role in nurturing socio-political consciousness among Muslims, advocating for equality, justice, and Muslim rights within the British Indian context. The Deoband Madrasa, established in 1866, and its scholars actively contributed to the Indian independence movement. While a majority of Barelvis and select influential Deobandi clerics supported the creation of Pakistan, the Kabaliya region (presently Waziristan) remained an autonomous zone throughout the British Raj, adhering to Shah Abdul Aziz's fatwa. During the Partition movement, Deobandi Ulema, including Mufti Muhammad Shafi and Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani, persuaded Kabali chieftains to align with Pakistan, promising the implementation of Sharia rule. Conversely, most Deobandi Ulema, led by Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, opposed the creation of Pakistan and the two-nation theory.
After Pakistan's inception, Islamic scholars and jihadist groups found themselves disillusioned and betrayed by the ruling system, as the country remained bereft of governance under Sharia Law. The separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) exacerbated the frustration, as its leaders opted for a democratic system.
Jihadist groups in Pakistan have been actively seeking to establish Islamic rule since the country's inception in 1947. At various times, these groups received state sponsorship, notably during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the Kashmir conflict. President Ziaul Haq harbored ambitions of utilizing the Mujahideen as a proxy force in South and Central Asia, and Waziristan became a safe haven for local and foreign mujahideen. The region's population, deeply entrenched in orthodox Islam and staunch traditionalism, played a crucial role in laying the groundwork for jihadist activities, with Mullah Powinda being a pioneer of jihad in Waziristan. The present Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) traces its roots to this region, highlighting that jihadist activities are not a new phenomenon for Pakistan.
During the Soviet-Afghan war, foreign Arab Mujahideen found shelter in Pakistan, using the land as a launching pad against Soviet invaders. Al-Qaeda seized this opportunity, merging with local groups and strengthening jihadist networks. Even before Al-Qaeda, sporadic jihadist groups in Pakistan sought to establish a Sharia-ruled nation. Negotiations between Mujahideen groups and the Pakistani government have been intermittent, centering on the demand for a modern state and sovereignty, especially regarding the withdrawal of government security forces from claimed areas.
Since Pakistan's creation, the ruling system has faced numerous challenges, with no democratic prime minister completing their tenure without military intervention. The military has remained a powerful force, influencing the political landscape in Pakistan. After 76 years of independence, economic and political challenges have left the people frustrated, leading to a search for alternatives, as evident in the fervent protests by Islamist groups in 2022.
Following the Lal Masjid incident in June 2007, Al-Qaeda and its local offshoots, particularly the TTP, openly declared war against the Pakistani government system. After the Taliban-U.S. truce in 2021, more than 40 local jihadist groups merged with the TTP, solidifying their presence in society. Their growing strength and expanded influence, especially in Balochistan, reflect changing dynamics. The TTP's guerrilla modus operandi now primarily targets security forces, demonstrating a shift in their operational policy while maintaining popular support in certain regions.
In my opinion, the government of Pakistan and its establishment have committed strategic blunders. Firstly, the strategic misstep of expelling undocumented Pashtuns into Afghanistan, ostensibly for security reasons, has backfired. The Pashtun community, historically divided along the Durand Line, vehemently rejects this colonial-era border. The resultant insult and determination among the sensitive Pashtuns to retaliate pose a significant threat. Secondly, there may be reason to believe that Imran Khan has a covert tie with Islamist groups. Imran's PTI could form a government in provinces where jihadist groups are influential. Consequently, sidelining Imran inadvertently aids these jihadist groups in garnering popular support. This confluence of missteps contributes to the complex dynamics fuelling the rise of jihadist influence in Pakistan.
Presently, TTP has extended its influence into Gilgit Baltistan and Balochistan, marking a concerning development. Reports indicate that the Balochistan Liberation Army has forged alliances with the TTP, collectively advocating for Shariah rule in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Gilgit Baltistan, and Kashmir. The backdrop of atrocities faced by Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir at the hands of Indian security forces further intensifies the agenda of jihadist groups. Al-Qaeda's strategic plan involves aiding persecuted Kashmiri Muslims once their objectives in Pakistan are achieved. This unfolding scenario raises the possibility of the Pakistani establishment to compromise with TTP for governing system less sovereignty. On the other hand, shifting jihadist threat towards Kashmir will ultimately align with the ambition of the military.
The geopolitical landscape of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East has undergone a profound transformation due to the United States-led 'War on Terror.' Last two decades, this mission has encountered relative failure in achieving political objectives and eradicating purported terrorist organizations globally. Nevertheless, it has yielded economic gains for the military-industrial complex. Regrettably, the aftermath of the War on Terror has witnessed the ascendance of authoritarian regimes in certain Asian countries, undermining democratic values. It is crucial for Pakistani establishment to recognize that people tend to gravitate towards better alternatives, and countering an ideological movement necessitates the emergence of another ideological force. In this context, coercion and intimidation could risk pushing individuals towards alternative ideological blocs.
The writer is a political and defence analyst based in Bangladesh.
Messenger/Fameema
